In Personam and Beyond the Grasp: In Search of Jurisdiction and Accountability for Foreign Defendants by Popper, Andrew F.
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 63 
Issue 1 Fall 2013 Article 4 
4-2014 
In Personam and Beyond the Grasp: In Search of Jurisdiction and 
Accountability for Foreign Defendants 
Andrew F. Popper 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, 
and the Jurisdiction Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Andrew F. Popper, In Personam and Beyond the Grasp: In Search of Jurisdiction and Accountability for 
Foreign Defendants, 63 Cath. U. L. Rev. 155 (2014). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol63/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For 
more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
In Personam and Beyond the Grasp: In Search of Jurisdiction and Accountability 
for Foreign Defendants 
Cover Page Footnote 
Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law. Thanks go to the following bright and 
hard-working Washington College of Law students: Irene A. Firippis, Lauren Diane Garry, Nicole Irwin, 
Laura C. Lanso, and Timothy Valley. Thanks also to Dean Claudio Grossman for his encouragement and 
support and to Microsoft, Inc. for assistance with student funding. 
This article is available in Catholic University Law Review: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol63/iss1/4 
  155
IN PERSONAM AND BEYOND THE GRASP: IN 
SEARCH OF JURISDICTION AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR FOREIGN DEFENDANTS 
Andrew F. Popper+ 
I.  THE COST OF IT AND IP THEFT ................................................................... 157 
II.  DOCTRINAL ROADBLOCKS TO SECURING JURISDICTION OVER  
FOREIGN ENTITIES ................................................................................ 159 
A.  The Roots of In Personam Jurisdiction .............................................. 160 
B.  Asahi and Nicastro: The Plot Thickens .............................................. 164 
III.  MISCONDUCT, MINIMUM CONTACTS, AND MAXIMUM CONFUSION ......... 169 
A.  Domestic Subsidiaries ........................................................................ 169 
B.  Non-Affiliated Users or Sellers .......................................................... 170 
IV.  CALDER AND THE EFFECT OF INTENTIONALITY ON IN PERSONAM 
JURISDICTION ....................................................................................... 177 
A.  The Calder Doctrine........................................................................... 178 
B.  Aiming and the Brunt ......................................................................... 179 
V.  A BEGINNING: THE FIRST TWO (OF HOPEFULLY MANY) STATE 
 UNFAIR COMPETITION CASES AND THE POTENTIAL FOR  
FTC ACTION ......................................................................................... 183 
A.  State Unfair Trade .............................................................................. 184 
B.  The Federal Trade Commission ......................................................... 188 
VI.  LOOKING FORWARD ................................................................................. 190 
VII.  CONCLUSION .......................................................................................... 192 
 
Since its inception, the U.S. legal system has evinced a meaningful 
commitment to the protection of property.1  This Article explores why certain 
                                                 
 + Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law.  Thanks go to the following 
bright and hard-working Washington College of Law students: Irene A. Firippis, Lauren Diane 
Garry, Nicole Irwin, Laura C. Lanso, and Timothy Valley. Thanks also to Dean Claudio Grossman 
for his encouragement and support and to Microsoft, Inc. for assistance with student funding. 
 1. Even though the focus of this work, protection of private property from  
non-governmental parties, lacks an explicit home in the Constitution, the idea of protection of 
private property is central to our concept of justice.  See John Locke, The Second Treatise of 
Government: An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government, in 
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 267, 350–52 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) 
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property, specifically information technology and intellectual property (IT and 
IP), is so difficult to protect when used, stolen, or pirated by a foreign entity or 
individual.  It is not a question of the wrongfulness of IT or IP theft.  Intentional 
misconduct of this type is readily condemned and subject to sanction under U.S. 
law2 and the laws of most other countries as well.3  For those sanctions to 
function, however, victims of such theft must have access to a robust, effective 
judicial system, and the court or other enforcement agency in that system must 
have personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 
This Article focuses on the difficulty of securing personal jurisdiction (in 
personam jurisdiction) over non-U.S. defendants in U.S. courts.  Given the fact 
that remedies for IP and IT theft are difficult to secure under the legal regimes 
of many growth markets—which collectively account for the bulk of goods 
available to U.S. consumers—those who steal IT and IP will not be held 
accountable unless they can be brought before a U.S. court or made subject to 
the authority of a U.S. state or federal agency, an unacceptable and  
all-too-common occurrence with devastating social and economic 
consequences. 
This Article will explore the difficulties a victim of IT or IP theft faces when 
attempting to hold a foreign defendant accountable in United States courts.  The 
Article begins by looking at the staggering costs that burden United States 
entities due to IT and IP theft.  It then discusses the various legal roadblocks that 
prevent United States plaintiffs from exercising personal jurisdiction over 
defendants in United States courts.  The Article explores the various tests courts 
have applied to determine whether the court has actual jurisdiction over.  The 
Article concludes by examining several potential solutions to the jurisdiction 
problem, including state unfair trade actions, enforcement by the FTC, and 
federal legislation. 
                                                 
(1988) (explaining that mankind came together under governments as a means to preserve their 
property).  Locke’s influence on the U.S. legal system is hardly controversial—Locke asserted that 
protection of private property is the responsibility of government.  See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, 
TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 17 (1985) (noting that, 
consistent with John Locke’s belief that property protection is the purpose of government, the 
Constitution was meant to protect private property); Cecelia M. Kenyon, Republicanism and 
Radicalism in the American Revolution: An Old-Fashioned Interpretation, 19 WM. & MARY Q. 
153, 172 n.13 (1962) (explaining that property was the dominant right during some periods of U.S. 
history, despite its omission from the Declaration of Independence); Lynda J. Oswald, Property 
Rights Legislation and the Police Power, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 527, 535 (2000) (explaining that 
although John Locke stressed the preeminence of property, “[p]rotection of private property  
. . . [is not an] absolute in the U.S. legal system”). 
 2. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006) (“unfair methods of competition in or affecting 
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared 
unlawful”). 
 3. See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/acta (last visited Sept. 4, 2013) (discussing the several 
countries that most recently signed the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, which was designed 
to thwart trademark and copyright theft around the world). 
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I.  THE COST OF IT AND IP THEFT 
The value of stolen IT and IP is staggering.  A recent White House study noted 
that losses in 2008 alone could total as much as a trillion dollars.4  Considering 
only theft of domestic IP and IT by foreign entities, a standard estimate of annual 
loss is around $200 billion.5  Although assessments of actual annual losses vary, 
sources estimate that between $58 billion and $1 trillion is lost each year.6  A 
report by the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development 
(OECD) found that “international trade in counterfeit and pirated products could 
have been up to USD 200 billion in 2005.”7  A 2011 International Trade 
Commission report found that IP theft by Chinese entities alone from U.S. 
companies with significant IP holdings exceeded $48 billion in 2009.8  The 
International Chamber of Commerce estimates “the total magnitude of 
counterfeiting and piracy worldwide . . . to be well over US$600 billion.”9 
In the wake of this radical diminution of the value of IT and IP, incentives for 
creativity, invention, innovation, and efficiency falter.  If left unsolved, the 
                                                 
 4. WHITE HOUSE, CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW: ASSURING A TRUSTED AND RESILIENT 
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE 2 (2009), available at  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf. 
 5. Neal Asbury, EU Turns Its Back on Intellectual Property Theft, MONEY NEWS (Jul. 19, 
2012), http://www.moneynews.com/NealAsbury/EU-Intellectual-Property-Theft/2012/07/19/id 
/445817 (stating that the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative estimated total losses of  
$200-$250 billion in a single year). 
 6. See Intellectual Property Theft, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/white_collar/ipr/ipr (last visited Sept. 22, 2013) 
(estimating the cost at billions of dollars per year and noting that most of the theft is not domestic); 
U.S. CONGRESS JOINT ECON. COMM. CHAIRMAN’S STAFF, THE IMPACT OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY THEFT ON THE ECONOMY 2 (2012), available at http://www.jec.senate.gov/public 
/index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_id=aa0183d4-8ad9-488f-9e38-7150a3bb62be; BUS. SOFTWARE 
ALLIANCE, EIGHTH ANNUAL BSA GLOBAL SOFTWARE 2010 PIRACY STUDY 1 (2011), available 
at http://globalstudy.bsa.org/2010/downloads/study_pdf/2010_BSA_Piracy_Study-Standard.pdf; 
U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, CHINA: EFFECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT AND 
INDIGENOUS INNOVATION POLICIES ON THE U.S. ECONOMY xiv (2011), available at 
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4226.pdf (stating that losses attributable to Chinese 
theft of IT alone exceeded $48 billion in 2009); BUS. ACTION TO STOP COUNTERFEITING AND 
PIRACY, ESTIMATING THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS OF COUNTERFEITING AND 
PIRACY 3 (2011), available at http://www.iccwbo.org/Data/Documents/Bascap/Global-Impacts-
Study—-Full-Report/ (placing the value of losses at $200 billion); STEPHEN E. SIWEK, INST. FOR 
POLICY INNOVATION, THE TRUE COST OF COPYRIGHT INDUSTRY PIRACY TO THE U.S. ECONOMY 
5–9 (2007), available at http://www.ipi.org/ipi_issues/detail/the-true-cost-of-copyright-industry 
-piracy-to-the-us-economy. 
 7. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF COUNTERFEITING 
AND PIRACY 4 (2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/industry/ind/38707619.pdf (estimating 
that annual losses from IT and IP theft could be as high as $200 billion). 
 8. Press Release, U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, U.S. Firms Report Losing Sales, Profits, 
Royalties, and Brand Reputations Due to IPR Infringement in China Says USITC (May 18, 2011), 
available at http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/news_release/2011/er0518jj2.htm. 
 9. About, INTL’ CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, available at http://www.iccwbo.org/advocacy 
-codes-and-rules/bascap/about (last visited Sept. 22, 2013). 
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problem of IT and IP theft threaten established and nascent businesses, large 
publically-traded companies, and start-ups—in short, the core of the U.S. 
economy.  Furthermore, the theft of IT and IP perverts the marketplace, 
devastating U.S. companies that respect the rule of law and are thus undercut by 
those selling and using products made with stolen IT or IP.10 
The notion of fair and equal treatment, in this instance making foreign entities 
subject to the same rules and sanctions as domestic entities, that is, a level 
playing field in the marketplace, is deeply embedded in our culture.  Abraham 
Lincoln famously noted that one of the goals and purposes of civil government 
is, “that each [person] may have . . . an open field and a fair chance for [his] 
industry, enterprise, and intelligence.”11  Achieving that “open field” and “fair 
chance” in the IT and IP fields, given the prevalence of IP and IT theft, will 
require aggressive judicial and regulatory action in state and federal venues.12 
Unfortunately, legal problems associated with bringing those actions, 
specifically the restrictive and complicated rules governing in personam 
jurisdiction—the focus of this Article—stand in the way of just and appropriate 
remedies.  Without legal recourse, IP and IT owners lose almost incalculable 
value, the entire U.S market suffers, and, over time, millions of jobs will be 
lost.13 
Given the magnitude of the harm caused by stolen IT and IP and deeply held 
beliefs regarding fairness and equal treatment, it would be reasonable to think 
that U.S. courts would be anxious to protect those harmed by overt misconduct.  
But the U.S. legal system has failed to resolve the in personam jurisdiction 
conundrum, and thus, has not provided a reliable mechanism to hold accountable 
foreign entities that inflict tangible harms on U.S. companies and consumers 
                                                 
 10. See BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, supra note 6, at 4 (“Companies that do not pay for the 
programs they use to run their operations have an unfair cost advantage over companies that do, 
which skews competition.”). 
 11. Address by Abraham Lincoln to the 166th Ohio Regiment (Aug. 22, 1864), in X 
COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 203 (John G. Nicolay & John Hay eds., 1894). 
 12. Owners of IP and IT protected by U.S. copyrights cannot assert those rights beyond U.S. 
borders.  In other words, copyright entitlements do not extend extraterritorially, compounding the 
problem of IT and IP theft outside the United States.  See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, 133 S. 
Ct. 1351, 1355–58 (2013) (declining to provide relief to copyright holders for foreign “first sales” 
followed by domestic resale of books copyrighted in the U.S.); United Dictionary Co. v. G. & C. 
Merriam Co., 208 U.S. 260, 264 (1908) (deciding that the “force” of copyright laws do not extend 
outside the territorial United States); Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 
1098 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1001 (1994) (stating that copyright laws 
simply do not apply to infringing acts outside the U.S.); Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publ’g, Ltd., 
843 F.2d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 1988) (“It is well established that copyright laws generally do not have 
extraterritorial application.”); Robert Stigwood Grp. Ltd. v. O’Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1101 (2d Cir. 
1976) (“Copyright laws do not have extraterritorial operation.”). 
 13. See Intellectual Property Theft: Get Real Facts and Figures NAT’L CRIME PREVENTION 
COUNCIL, http://www.ncpc.org/topics/intellectual-property-theft/facts-and-figures (last visited 
Sept. 23, 2013) (explaining that intellectual property accounts for half of the United States’ exports, 
and detailing the various costs of counterfeiting and piracy). 
2013] In Search of Jurisdiction for Foreign Defendants 159 
through their theft of IT and IP.  Dean and Professor Wendy Collins Perdue 
recently characterized the law in this area as “splintered,” noting that the 
Supreme Court, rather than facilitating access to the courts, has muddled the 
law.14  She further explains that the Court has announced doctrine that is “wrong, 
or . . . at least misleading,” and has hit a “new low” in terms of providing a 
remedial roadmap for victims of IP and IT theft.15 
The jurisdictional limits over foreign entities in U.S. courts have allowed 
foreign IT and IP thieves to profit with impunity.16  Commenting on the 
difficulties private parties face protecting their interests, Professor John Parry 
explained, “non-U.S. manufacturers who entrust their product to a [domestic] 
distributor with the goal of serving the entire U.S. market will not be subject to 
personal jurisdiction in every state in which their products are sold.”17  Professor 
Parry further warned that foreign defendants will wantonly exploit this result.18  
Professor Taylor Simpson-Wood recently noted that foreign producers can 
“insulate themselves from suit in the United States, irrespective of the injury 
caused by . . . employing . . . a Pontius Pilate-like washing of the hands via 
 . . . [various] distribution scheme[s].”19  In short, IT and IP theft will continue 
and worsen if left unchecked and undaunted by the threat of any meaningful 
legal consequences. 
II.  DOCTRINAL ROADBLOCKS TO SECURING JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN 
ENTITIES 
When an entity is deprived of property, historic and basic notions of justice 
require a remedy because, as a general rule, where there is a right, there is a 
remedy.20  How bizarre that such a fundamental principle falters and sometimes 
fails entirely when the entity engaged in the misconduct is foreign. 
                                                 
 14. Wendy Collins Perdue, What’s “Sovereignty” Got to Do with It? Due Process, Personal 
Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court, 63 S.C. L. REV. 729, 729 (2012). 
 15. Id. 
 16. See Andrew F. Popper, Beneficiaries of Misconduct: A Direct Approach to IT Theft, 17 
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 27, 28–31 (2013); see also supra note 12 (explaining the difficulty 
inherent in holding foreign IT and IP thefts accountable). 
 17. John T. Parry, Introduction: Due Process, Borders, and the Qualities of  
Sovereignty—Some Thoughts on J. Macintyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
827, 850 (2012). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Taylor Simpson-Wood, In the Aftermath of Goodyear Dunlop: Oyez! Oyez! Oyez! A Call 
for a Hybrid Approach to Personal Jurisdiction in International Products Liability Controversies, 
64 BAYLOR L. REV. 113, 156 (2012) (internal citations omitted). 
 20. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 19 (Wayne 
Morrison ed., 2001) (“[I]t is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there 
is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded”); see also Marbury 
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163–66 (1803) (quoting and expounding upon Blackstone’s 
language). 
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At a very basic level, a foreign defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of a 
U.S. court when there are sufficient minimum contacts to connect that entity with 
the forum state and when the proceeding contemplated is fair.21  Given the harm 
caused by stolen IT and IP noted in the prior section, regardless of the way one 
calculates losses, the resulting damage is massive and the contact anything but 
minimum.  However, harm to victims has not been the common measure used 
to determine whether a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant.22 
A.  The Roots of In Personam Jurisdiction 
For more than one hundred years, the Supreme Court has attempted to provide 
guidance to lower courts on exercising in personam jurisdiction over foreign 
nationals.23  Two basic requirements emerged.  First, in light of the non-resident 
status of the defendant, the legal proceeding contemplated must be reasonable 
and fair in terms of the convenience of the forum, availability of evidence and 
witnesses, and other “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” 
fundamental to a fair trial.24  Second, there must be an adequate relationship or 
connection between the defendant and the state, often framed in terms of the 
defendant’s contacts with the forum, factored by the wisdom of asserting 
jurisdiction over foreign entities, the efficiency of intended judicial action, and 
respect for other legal regimes.25 
U.S. courts are appropriately cautious when their actions have implications 
for foreign affairs because the powers over conducting foreign affairs reside with 
the executive and legislative branches of government.26  Additionally, principals 
                                                 
 21. Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101, 
103, 150 (2010). 
 22. See infra Parts II.A-B (explaining how courts have traditionally defined personal 
jurisdiction). 
 23. Peterson, supra note 21, at 104 (noting that “[i]n the absence of meaningful principles 
established by the Supreme Court, the lower courts search for the significance of the Supreme 
Court’s caselaw in snippets and phrases taken out of context and then used as the basis for the 
courts’ opinions”). 
 24. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316  (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 
U.S. 457, 463 (1940)); Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1,  
76–77 (1991). 
 25. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415–16 (1984); 
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293–94 (1980). 
 26. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (vesting the power to conduct foreign affairs in the executive); 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting residual power over foreign affairs to the legislature).  
Nothing in Article III of the Constitution suggests the judiciary has a role to play in foreign affairs.  
Furthermore, the principles underlying the political question doctrine urge caution when cases 
extend beyond U.S. borders.  See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (stating that “it is 
error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial 
cognizance”); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (announcing that “[t]he 
conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the 
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of comity and deference to other sovereign states are appropriate for courts to 
consider.27  However, it is troubling that U.S. courts are perceived as a hostile 
forum for domestic victims of misconduct by foreign entities.  The unavailability 
of a forum for an injured plaintiff to seek a remedy in has serious 
consequences.28  The notion that the courthouse doors are closed can lead to the 
degradation of clearly articulated rights, particularly in the intellectual property 
field.29 
The starting point for discussing in personam jurisdiction is Pennoyer v. 
Neff.30  Pennoyer limited a state’s power to “extend its process beyond” its 
borders,31 holding that a court cannot assert in personam jurisdiction over a 
foreign entity unless there is a sufficient and meaningful relationship between 
the entity and the forum state, most easily established by personal service or 
actual presence.32  In International Shoe v. Washington, decided more than a 
half century later, the Court held that states could extend their reach beyond their 
borders to out-of-state parties so long as there are “certain minimum contacts” 
between the party and the forum state,33 as opposed to the actual presence or 
service of process required in Pennoyer.34  The question after International Shoe 
became assessing the fairness of the contemplated proceeding and the nature of 
the defendants’ contacts, both from a quantitative (how much value, money, 
impact, investment, etc.) and qualitative (of what type, legal interest, reliance, 
benefit from the forum state, etc.) perspective.35 
                                                 
Executive and Legislative . . . Departments of the Government . . . not subject to judicial inquiry or 
decision”). 
 27. See Philips Med. Sys. Int’l B.V. v. Bruetman, 8 F.3d 600, 604 (7th Cir. 1993) (defining 
comity in terms of the respect foreign nations owe each other); Paul supra note 24, at 3–4 
(explaining that comity embraces notions of reciprocity and goodwill between sovereign nations). 
 28. Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Just Fee Shifting, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 717, 720 (2010) (“[A] legal 
regime that does not guarantee to all individuals that their claims of injustice will be heard sends a 
message of disrespect and reinforces their sense of unworthiness.  As a consequence, the unequal 
access to justice yields a loss of legitimacy for the entire civil justice system and diminishes the 
acceptability of its adjudicative outcomes”). 
 29. Megan M. La Belle, Patent Litigation, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Public Good, 18 
GEO. MASON L. REV 43, 61–62 (2010) (discussing forum selection difficulties imposed on alleged 
infringers seeking relief in patent suits by a Federal Circuit rule stating that patent holders are not 
subject to personal jurisdiction in the federal court of an alleged infringer’s home state). 
 30. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
 31. 95 U.S. at 722. 
 32. See id. at 722–24. 
 33. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 34. Id. at 319–20. 
 35. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476–79 (1985) (listing various factors 
courts should consider in determining whether a defendant’s contacts are sufficient to properly 
bring it within the forum state’s jurisdiction). 
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In the wake of International Shoe, two tracks for in personam jurisdiction 
emerged: general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction.36  If a foreign entity has 
“substantial, continuous, and systematic” contacts with the forum state,37 a court 
can exercise general jurisdiction over that entity.38  General jurisdiction requires 
a level of contact with a forum state that approximates physical presence.39  A 
foreign entity with contacts sufficient for general jurisdiction is fully subject to 
the laws of that state, much the same as an entity or individual domiciled in that 
state.40  Evidence of contacts sufficient to establish general jurisdiction includes 
maintaining a business facility or office within the state, holding a license from 
the state, employing sales agents in the state, advertising or promotion targeting 
the state, solicitation of business within the state, or engaging in other acts that 
evince long-term presence in the forum state.41 
If the contacts are insufficient to establish general jurisdiction, a court may 
still exercise specific jurisdiction over a defendant.42  Specific jurisdiction exists 
when contacts, although not substantial, continuous, and systematic, nonetheless 
reflect a conscious transactional engagement in the forum state43 coupled with a 
                                                 
 36. See Burger King Corp, 471 U.S. at 473 n.15 (contrasting general and specific 
jurisdiction); International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318 (discussing how a entity can confer in person 
jurisdiction, although not in terms of specific and general jurisdiction); Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. 
Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998) (defining general and specific jurisdiction). 
 37. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1205 (9th Cir. 2006); Burger 
King Corp., 471 U.S. at 471–73; Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 
414–19 (1984); Mich. Nat’l Bank v. Quality Dinette, Inc., 888 F.2d 462, 466 (6th Cir. 1989).  The 
requirement that an entity have substantial, continuous, and systematic contacts with the forum 
state is not without criticism.  See Meir Feder, Goodyear, “Home,” and the Uncertain Future of 
Doing Business Jurisdiction, 63 S.C. L. REV. 671 (2012) (arguing that the standard is insufficient, 
and challenging the validity of “doing business” as a meaningful basis for jurisdiction); Harold G. 
Maier & Thomas R. McCoy, A Unifying Theory for Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 39 
AM. J. COMP. L. 249, 280 (1991) (challenging the legitimacy of general jurisdiction as a violation 
of the Due Process Clause). 
 38. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415; Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1205. 
 39. Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 40. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414. 
 41. Bancroft & Masters, 223 F.3d at 1086. 
 42. The Supreme Court recently explained the distinction in Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations, S.A. v. Brown: 
A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) 
[defendants] . . . when their affiliations with the State are so “continuous and systematic” 
as to render them essentially at home in the forum State. . . . Specific jurisdiction . . . 
depends on an “affiliatio[n] between the forum and the underlying controversy,” 
principally, activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum  
State. . . . [S]pecific jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of “issues deriving from, or 
connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.” 
131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011) (citations omitted). 
 43. See Carteret Sav. Bank, FA v. Shushan, 954 F.2d 141, 147 (3d Cir. 1992); N. Penn Gas 
Co. v. Corning Natural Gas Corp., 897 F.2d 687, 690 & n.2 (3d Cir. 1990); Marvel Worldwide, 
Inc. v. Kirby, 2010 WL 1655253, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2010). 
2013] In Search of Jurisdiction for Foreign Defendants 163 
purposeful availment of the benefits and protections of the state.44  Specific 
jurisdiction is transactional, case-specific, and unpredictable.45  A set of targeted 
sales that are part of a marketing strategy, advertising, or other direct and specific 
relationships coupled with purposeful availment would probably be sufficient.46 
For those seeking redress for U.S.-based harms caused by foreign IP and IT 
theft, specific jurisdiction cases potentially pose a significant challenge.  If a 
foreign entity has “set up shop” in the forum state (by having a place of business, 
employees, and localized marketing) and has a long-term, on-going business in 
that state, it is likely that the entity is subject to general jurisdiction and can be 
held accountable in court much like any resident of the state.47  In contrast, when 
products made abroad using stolen IT or IP “appear” in a state and are sold by 
others, the challenge for victims is to show that the sale or use of the product is 
not an incidental or sporadic transaction that would fall outside of the 
requirements for specific jurisdiction.48 
The questions specific jurisdiction present are challenging, particularly for 
transactions that do not involve extensive contacts, multiple sales, or long-term 
transactions.  In McGee v. International Life Insurance, the Court found that a 
single sale or contact could be sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction if the 
suit arises from that sale or contact.49  The Court clarified McGee a few months 
after it was decided in Hanson v. Denckla.50  The Hanson decision shifted the 
focus of the personal jurisdiction inquiry from the notion of a single sale or 
transaction to the more demanding International Shoe standard that centers on 
fairness, minimum contacts, and purposeful availment of the legal regime of the 
state.51  The Hanson Court held that the plaintiff must show that “the defendant 
                                                 
 44. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); see Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior 
Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112–13 (1987) (plurality opinion); Pervasive Software, Inc. v. Lexware 
GMBH & Co. KG, 688 F.3d 214, 222 (5th Cir. 2012) (affirming the dismissal of the case for lack 
of personal jurisdiction because the defendant did not purposefully avail itself of the privilege of 
doing business in Texas); Shamsuddin v. Vitamin Research Prods., 346 F. Supp. 2d 804, 813 (D. 
Md. 2004) (concluding that the court had no personal jurisdiction over a website operator that sold 
products on two occasions to residents of the forum state because web interactivity and two isolated 
sales did not rise to the level of purposeful availment). 
 45. See LSI Indus., Inc. v. Hubbell Lighting, Inc., 232 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
(“Neither the United States Supreme Court nor [the Federal Circuit] has outlined a specific test to 
follow when analyzing whether a defendant’s activities within a state are ‘continuous and 
systematic.’  Instead, a court must look at the facts of each case to make such a determination.”). 
 46. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112–13. 
 47. See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements for general 
jurisdiction). 
 48. See supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements for specific 
jurisdiction). 
 49. 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957). 
 50. Hansen v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
 51. Id. 
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purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the 
forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”52 
Twenty years later, the Court refined Hanson, first in Shaffer v. Heitner, 
requiring that the defendant’s presence or contacts be sufficient to meet the due 
process fair play and reasonability requirements;53 and second, in Kulko v. 
Superior Court, reiterating the minimum contacts test and discussing how the 
interests of the plaintiff and the state are factored into the inquiry.54  In cases of 
IT or IP theft, to assert specific jurisdiction, a plaintiff must show that the 
defendant “‘purposely directed’ his activities at residents of the forum . . . and 
the litigation results from alleged injuries that ‘arise out of or relate to’ those 
activities.”55  The conduct should be sufficient such that foreign national[s] 
should “reasonably anticipate being haled into court.”56  These requirements 
suggest that the conscious marketing choices and expectations of the 
defendant—the nature of the defendant’s action—not the harm to the plaintiff, 
are the central considerations in determining whether a court can assert 
personam jurisdiction over a defendant. 
B.  Asahi and Nicastro: The Plot Thickens 
In 1987, the question of the nature of the sufficiency of a defendant’s actions 
or contact with the forum for purposes of in personam jurisdiction came to a 
head in Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court.57  In Asahi, the 
plaintiff’s wife was killed when a motorcycle they were riding collided with a 
tractor.58  The accident occurred in California and allegedly was caused by a 
defect in one of the motorcycle’s tires as well as a defect in the valve in that 
tire.59  The tire was made by Cheng Shin Rubber, a Taiwanese company, and the 
valve was made by Asahi Metal Industry Co, Ltd., a Japanese company.60 
About twenty percent of Cheng Shin’s U.S. sales were in California, and 
although there was some disagreement on the issue between the parties, it is safe 
to conclude that a meaningful number of Cheng Shin tires sold in California had 
Asahi valves.61  Cheng Shin then filed a cross-claim against Asahi in California 
seeking indemnification.62  Before judgment, the plaintiff settled with Cheng 
                                                 
 52. Id. (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v.  Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)). 
 53. 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977). 
 54. 436 U.S. 84, 91–92 (1978). 
 55. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (quoting Keeton v. Hustler 
Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984) and Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 
466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)). 
 56. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). 
 57. 480 U.S. 102, 105 (1987). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 105–06. 
 60. Id. at 106. 
 61. Id. at 106–07. 
 62. Id. 
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Shin Rubber and the various other defendants, leaving only the indemnity suit.63  
Cheng Shin asserted that the court had in personam jurisdiction over Asahi based 
on the fact that Asahi could foresee the presence of its products in California and 
was unquestionably aware that a meaningful number of its valves would be 
incorporated into tires sold in California.64 
Asahi argued that it was not subject to the jurisdiction of the California courts 
because it never contemplated being sued in the U.S., had no employees, offices, 
or real estate in California, and because it did not make direct sales or solicit 
business in California.65 
Based on these facts, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and asked 
whether the mere awareness on the part of a foreign defendant that the 
components it manufactured . . . would reach the forum State [and 
enter] the stream of commerce constitutes “minimum contacts” 
between the defendant and the forum State such that the exercise of 
jurisdiction “does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.’”66 
The Court found that even if one assumes Asahi was aware that Cheng Shin 
products containing Asahi valves were sold in California, and even if the 
products were, broadly defined, in the stream of commerce, Asahi did not 
“purposefully avail itself of the California market. . . . It did not create, control, 
or employ the distribution system that brought its valves to California.”67  
Consequently, the Court found that Asahi had insufficient contacts to satisfy the 
Due Process minimum contact rules.68 
On the question of fairness and substantial justice, the Court noted that 
because the defendant Asahi was a foreign company (raising problems of 
convenience and witness availability) and because the plaintiff, Cheng Chin was 
not a California resident, the interest of the forum state was limited.69  This is an 
important consideration for IT and IP theft cases and suggests that an action 
against a foreign entity brought by a state resident or the state Attorney General 
on behalf of the state might be treated differently than an action brought by a 
non-resident.  As discussed later in this Article, a state court has a powerful 
interest in hearing claims brought by the state on behalf of its residents.70  The 
Asahi Court made this distinction clear, explaining that when there are minimum 
contacts and the plaintiff is a state resident (or is the state itself), “the exercise 
                                                 
 63. Id. at 106. 
 64. Id. at 107–08. 
 65. See id. 
 66. Id. at 105 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). 
 67. Id. at 112. 
 68. Id. at 113. 
 69. Id. at 113–14. 
 70. See infra text accompanying notes 241–245. 
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of jurisdiction will justify even the serious burdens placed on the alien 
defendant.”71 
In reaching its decision regarding jurisdiction over foreign defendants, the 
Court noted concerns about fairness, convenience, and international relations.72  
The Court cautioned that “‘[g]reat care and reserve should be exercised when 
extending our notions of personal jurisdiction into the international field.’”73  
Nowhere in the Asahi opinion does the Court suggest that similar care should be 
given to protecting the rights and entitlements of domestic victims of wrongful 
conduct. 
It is unclear whether the Court intended to rewrite the requirements for in 
personam jurisdiction in Asahi, an atypical case involving a component-part 
third-party indemnification dispute between an out-of-state entity and an  
out-of-the-United States entity.  This was not a case involving the rights of an 
in-state plaintiff harmed by the acts of a foreign defendant.  Though written by 
a divided court,74 Asahi initiated a jurisprudential mudslide, dividing both 
federal circuits and state courts.75  A decade and a half later, the rifts in Asahi 
                                                 
 71. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114. 
 72. See id. at 114–15. 
 73. Id. at 116 (citing United States v. First Nat’l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 404 (1965) (Harlan, 
J., dissenting)). 
 74. In fact, Asahi is hardly as crisp legal precedent or a clear determination of the law.  The 
case generated three opinions, and only the first part of the first opinion, written by Justice 
O’Connor, was joined by a majority of the Court.  In the remainder of her plurality opinion, Justice 
O’Connor was joined by only Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Powell and Scalia.  Id.  Justices 
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun concurred separately in a second opinion, and Justice 
Stevens, White, and Blackmun wrote a third opinion.  Id. at 116, 121. 
 75. Asahi (and its many interpretations) has been cited to thousands of times by state and 
federal courts and is the subject of countless law review articles.  See, e.g., Rodger D. Citron, The 
Last Common Law Justice: The Personal Jurisdiction Jurisprudence of Justice John Paul Stevens, 
88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 433 (2011); Diane S. Kaplan, Paddling up the Wrong Stream: Why the 
Stream of Commerce Theory is Not Part of the Minimum Contacts Doctrine, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 
503 (2003); Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts After Goodyear and McIntyre, 
80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 202 (2011); Bruce Posnak, The Court Doesn’t Know Its Asahi from Its 
Wortman: A Critical View of the Constitutional Constraints of Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 41 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 875 (1990); Linda J. Silberman, “Two Cheers” for International Shoe (and 
None for Asahi): An Essay on the Fiftieth Anniversary of International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 755 (1995); Howard B. Stravitz, Sayonara to Minimum Contacts: Asahi Metal Industry Co. 
v. Superior Court, 39 S.C. L. REV. 729 (1988); Danielle Tarin & Christopher Macchiaroli, Refining 
the Due Process Contours of General Jurisdiction Over Foreign Manufacturers, 11 J. INT’L BUS. 
& L. 49 (2012); Christine M. Wiseman, Reconstructing the Citadel: The Advent of Jurisdictional 
Privity, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 403, 424–37 (1993) (criticizing Asahi.); Earl M. Maltz, Comment, 
Unraveling the Conundrum of the Law of Personal Jurisdiction: A Comment on Asahi Metal 
Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 1987 DUKE L.J. 669 (1987); Kristianna L. Sciarra, 
Note, A Gap in Personal Jurisdiction Reasoning: An Analysis of J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. 
Nicastro, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 195 (2013). 
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were still present in the Court, as evident in the Court’s more recent Nicastro76 
and Goodyear77 decisions. 
However one reads Asahi, the case reflects the Court’s abundant concern for 
foreign defendants and leaves domestic plaintiffs with an uncertain burden.  In 
her plurality opinion, Justice O’Connor’s concluded that “[t]he placement of a 
product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant 
purposefully directed toward the forum state” such that the court could exercise 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant.78  In a separate opinion, Justice 
Brennan disagreed, accepting the argument that the knowing and foreseeable 
placement of a product in the stream of commerce is sufficient for the purposes 
of establishing in personam jurisdiction.79  Justice O’Connor’s perspective could 
make it difficult for victims of foreign IP or IT theft to “hale” into court a foreign 
defendant who merely uses or sells, on their own or through domestic retailers, 
goods made with stolen IT or IP.80  Justice Brennan’s perspective makes 
bringing such cases more feasible—but his opinion was not endorsed by a 
majority of the Court.81  As the next section indicates, the split between these 
two points of view persists. 
In 2011, the Court decided J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, a case 
that raised many of the questions posed and only partially answered in Asahi.82  
During the course of his employment, plaintiff Robert Nicastro, a New Jersey 
resident, sustained permanent disabling injuries to his hand while using a 
machine manufactured by the British company, J. McIntyre Machinery.83  The 
machine was imported into the United States by an Ohio company and then sold 
to Nicastro’s employer.84  J. McIntyre Machinery sold four machines that ended 
up in New Jersey, sent representatives to U.S. trade shows, held U.S. patents on 
some of its products, and, through a U.S. distributor, advertised its products in 
the United States.85  In short, the machines were intended for use in the United 
States and had entered the U.S. stream of commerce.86 
A plurality of the Court held that although the defendant directed activities at 
and benefited from U.S. commerce, it had not purposefully availed itself of New 
                                                 
 76. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2785 (2011) (plurality opinion); 
see also infra notes 82–95 and accompanying text (discussing the Nicastro decision). 
 77. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853–54 (2011). 
 78. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112. 
 79. Id. at 116–17 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 80. See id. at 115–16. 
 81. See id. at 116–17. 
 82. 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2785 (2011) (plurality opinion). 
 83. Id. at 2786. 
 84. Id. at 2796–97 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 85. Id. at 2786. 
 86. See id. 
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Jersey law by directing conduct specifically at the state.87  Even if the goods 
were in the state’s stream of commerce, the plurality explained that a defendant 
must both target the forum state and purposely avail itself of the rights and 
protections of that state.88  In other words, a defendant’s actions in seeking the 
protection of the forum or using its laws was the proper measure of the 
sufficiency of the contacts with the state, not the foreseeable presence of their 
products.89 
Although Nicastro could have clarified the confusion left by Asahi, the Court 
was unable to make a clear statement of the law to guide future courts.  The case 
was decided by a plurality and rejected (to the extent a plurality can be 
dispositive90) the idea that a foreseeable sale in a state on its own is sufficient 
for in personam jurisdiction.91  When a defendant’s product is merely in the 
stream of commerce and is foreseeably made available for sale in the forum 
state, the Nicastro plurality opinion dictates that there is insufficient contact for 
purposes of specific or general jurisdiction.92 
Justice Breyer noted in his concurrence in Nicastro that although the foreign 
“[m]anufacturer permitted, indeed wanted, its independent American Distributor 
to sell its machines to anyone in America willing to buy them,” it was unfair to 
hale the defendant into court without more extensive contacts with the forum 
state.93  Justice Breyer also expressed concern for small foreign defendants who 
cause injury to persons in the United States, stating that it is “unfair” to hold 
these defendants accountable in court because of the burden of requiring foreign 
entities “to understand not only the tort law of every State, but also the wide 
variance in the way courts within different States apply that law.”94  Concern 
over fairness for foreign defendants dominates the Court’s opinions on personal 
jurisdiction matters95—but the court does not appear to express equal concern 
for domestic victims of misconduct.  It should not be so difficult to protect 
                                                 
 87. Id. at 2790–91 (explaining that the defendant did not engage in activity in New Jersey 
“that reveal an intent to invoke or benefit from the protection of its laws” and therefore is not subject 
to in personam jurisdiction in that state). 
 88. See id. at 2788 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)); World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980). 
 89. See id. at 2788–89. 
 90. See Mark Alan Thurmon, Note, When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the Precedential 
Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 42 DUKE L.J. 419 (1992); John F. Davis & William 
L. Reynolds, Juridical Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the Supreme Court, 1974 DUKE L.J. 59, 62 
(1974). 
 91. See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2788–89. 
 92. See id. at 2789. 
 93. Id. at 2791–92 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 94. Id. at 2794. 
 95. GSS Grp. Ltd v. Nat’l Port Auth., 680 F.3d 805, 813 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citing Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2850–51, 2853 (2011); Nicastro, 131 S. 
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process protections”). 
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interests that are so fundamental—specifically interests in IP or IT created by a 
U.S. entity or person. 
III.  MISCONDUCT, MINIMUM CONTACTS, AND MAXIMUM CONFUSION 
As just discussed, there is abundant precedent detailing when courts are 
prohibited from exercising jurisdiction over foreign defendants.  But do clear 
and uniform criteria exist to indicate when it is permissible for a court to protect 
the interests of those victimized by foreign entities and individuals? 
There is logic to the notion that a product that is foreseeably present in the 
United States and designed for domestic sales should be sufficient to establish 
in personam jurisdiction over a foreign user or seller.  However, the plurality in 
Nicastro noted that a single transaction or isolated sale of a product is 
insufficient to support jurisdiction—even if the presence of the product in the 
forum state is foreseeable.96  Instead, a regular flow of goods in a particular 
jurisdiction must be coupled with actions demonstrating that the seller or 
manufacturer availed themselves of the market opportunities and the rights and 
protections of the legal system in the forum state.97  Justice Breyer’s concurrence 
in Nicastro also suggests that the importance of evidence indicating a “specific 
effort” by the defendant to sell its product in the forum state, such as lists of 
potential customers in the forum state or advertising or marketing in the forum 
state.98  Foreign manufacturers that steal IP and IT and then sell their products 
through U.S. wholesalers and retailers often will have little need for the indicia 
of state contacts suggested by both the Nicastro plurality and Justice Breyer in 
his concurrence. 
A.  Domestic Subsidiaries 
Given the profitability of IT or IP theft and the difficulties associated with 
establishing in personam jurisdiction over foreign defendants, it is worth asking 
whether the minimum contacts problem might be solved when the seller or user 
in the forum state is a subsidiary of a foreign parent company.99  If the subsidiary 
is owned and fully controlled by the foreign parent company, the chances of 
                                                 
 96. See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2788. 
 97. See id. 
 98. Id. at 2792. 
 99. See Am. Tel. & Tel Co. v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 
1996) (holding that a foreign parent corporation’s relationship with its domestic subsidiary was 
insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction); Hargrave v. Fibreboard Corp., 710 F.2d 1154, 1159, 
1161 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that a foreign corporation did not fall within the reach of the Texas 
long-arm statute because, as a parent company, it did not have enough control over its domestic 
subsidiary to establish personal jurisdiction); Boryk v. De Havilland Aircraft Co., 341 F.2d 666, 
668 (2d Cir. 1965) (stating that for purposes of establishing personal jurisdiction, under New York 
law it is immaterial whether the parent corporation or the subsidiary engaged in the activities at 
issue). 
170 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 63:155 
hauling the parent into a U.S. court increases.100  But it is insufficient to rely on 
the subsidiary’s contact with the forum state to reach the parent company for 
personal jurisdiction purposes, regardless of how the corporate relationship 
between the parent and subsidiary is structured.101  For example, in Hargrave v. 
Fiberboard Corp., the court explained that: “[g]enerally, a foreign parent 
corporation is not subject to the jurisdiction of a forum state merely because its 
subsidiary is present or doing business there; the mere existence of a parent-
subsidiary relationship is not sufficient to warrant the assertion of jurisdiction 
over the foreign parent.”102  Instead, to establish personal jurisdiction over the 
parent company, the parent must exert “such domination and control over its 
subsidiary ‘that they do not in reality constitute separate and distinct corporate 
entities but are one and the same corporation for purposes of jurisdiction.’”103 
The problem, of course, is that foreign entities that engage in IT theft or use 
stolen IT in the production of goods are probably smart enough to keep their 
subsidiaries separate, or to use independent sellers within the United States with 
whom they do not have formal long-term corporate ownership relationships.  In 
Hargrave, the court found that a domestic company can be construed as a 
dependent subsidiary based on the amount of the subsidiary’s stock the parent 
controls and the extent to which the parent and subsidiary share headquarters, 
officers, directors, corporate formalities, accounting systems, and overall 
authority for the day-to-day operation of the subsidiary.104  From a broad 
perspective, it is unclear how many parties involved in IT and IP theft cases 
would meet that test. 
B.  Non-Affiliated Users or Sellers 
Beyond the parent-subsidiary relationship, the rules begin to blur, and depend 
largely on the state and the circumstances.  Illinois, for example, has adopted a 
fairly broad (and somewhat unique) interpretation of the elemental fairness 
requirement of personam jurisdiction.105  Recently that standard was set out in 
Russell v. SNFA: 
To determine reasonableness, courts consider the following factors: 
(1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the forum state’s interest in 
resolving the dispute; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief; (4) 
the interest of the affected forums, including the forum state, in the 
                                                 
 100. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 479 n.22 (1985). 
 101. See Am. Tel. & Tel Co., 94 F.3d at 590; Hargrave, 710 F.2d at 1159. 
 102. Hargrave, 710 F.2d at 1159. 
 103. Id. (quoting 2 J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 4.25[6], 4-273 (2d 
ed. 1982)). 
 104. See id. at 1160–61. 
 105. See Russell v. SNFA, 946 N.E.2d 1076, 1085 (Ill App. Ct. 2011), aff’d, 987 N.E.2d 778 
(Ill. 2013). 
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most efficient resolution of the dispute; and (5) the interest of the 
affected forums in the advancement of substantive social policies.106 
The Russell case involved the deadly crash of an Agusta helicopter in 2003.  
The helicopter, which ultimately ended up in Illinois where the crash occurred, 
was built in Italy with French parts and exported to the United States through a 
German company.107  The court found it noteworthy that the defendant SNFA 
did not disclaim knowledge of Agusta helicopters sales in the United States or 
Agusta’s American subsidiary that distributed helicopters in the United 
States.108  Relying on the reasonable foreseeability of the presence of the 
product—thus following Justice Brennan’s stream of commerce test outlined in 
Asahi—the Illinois court concluded that exercising personal jurisdiction over the 
foreign defendants was proper.109  The Court did not discuss whether the 
defendant knowingly accessed the legal system of the state or contemplated and 
planned to benefit from that system, thus diluting the importance of purposeful 
availment emphasized by Nicastro.  Unfortunately, Russell is the exception, not 
the rule.110 
In Willemsen v. Invacare Corp.,a post-Nicastro opinion from Oregon, the 
plaintiffs’ mother was killed in a fire allegedly caused by a defect in the battery 
charger of her motorized wheelchair.111  Plaintiffs were residents of Oregon.112  
Invacare built the wheelchair at its Ohio plant and the wheelchair’s battery 
charger was manufactured by CTE, a Taiwanese company.113  CTE made its 
battery chargers in accordance with contract specifications set by Invacare and 
agreed to indemnify Invacare for liability resulting from problems with the 
chargers.114  CTE disputed the finding of personal jurisdiction, claiming that it 
has not purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in 
Oregon.115  CTE reasoned that Invacare targeted Oregon; thus under Nicastro, 
the possibility that CTE could have foreseen that its battery chargers may be sold 
or used in Oregon is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction in Oregon 
courts.116 
                                                 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 1079. 
 108. Id. at 1085. 
 109. Id. at 1087; see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 116–17 
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 110. See Greg Saetrum, Note, Righting the Ship: Implications of J. McIntyre v. Nicastro and 
How to Navigate the Stream of Commerce in Its Wake, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 499, 505, 507 (2013) 
(quoting J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789 (2011) (plurality opinion)) 
(noting that courts tend to rely on Justice O’Connor’s test more than Justice Brennan’s because 
Brennan’s test is less stringent and is inconsistent with the proper exercise of judicial power). 
 111. 282 P.3d 867, 870 (Or. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 984 (2013). 
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The Oregon court disagreed with CTE, suggesting that neither Asahi nor 
Nicastro provided a clear answer to critical personal jurisdiction questions.117  
The court stated that “[w]hen . . . ‘a fragmented Court decides a case and no 
single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the 
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members 
who concurred in the judgmen[t] on the narrowest grounds.’”118  Freed from 
strictures of the Nicastro plurality opinion, the court found that CTE had 
minimum contacts with Oregon such that CTE has purposefully availed itself of 
Oregon law.119  The court reasoned that CTE’s large number of sales to Invacare 
and the indemnification agreement between the companies suggested that CTE 
anticipated a role in potential legal proceedings.120  The court looked to Justice 
Breyer’s concurring opinion in Nicastro, which explained that “without 
evidence of a ‘regular . . . flow or a regular course of sales’ in [the forum state] 
. . . was insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state-
defendant,” and found that CTE’s pattern of sales demonstrated a “regular flow 
or regular course of sales in Oregon.”121  The court found such activities can 
form a foundation for specific jurisdiction because under these circumstances, a 
foreign defendant could “anticipate[] the need to defend against the very sort of 
claim that the plaintiffs [filed in this case].”122  In sum, the Willemsen court held 
that it “does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” to 
exert jurisdiction over a foreign company that benefits from sales in a state, 
foresees those sales, and therefore, anticipates the potential for liability from 
those sales.123 
Foreseeability of presence, although a logical factor to consider, has not 
traditionally defined the personal jurisdiction analysis.124  Outside of cases like 
Russell or Willemsen or those cases involving subsidiary relationships that meet 
the criteria mentioned above, victims of IT or IP theft are left with the 
uncertainty of Asahi and the negative implications of the Nicastro plurality.125  
If the most that can be said about items designed for sale in the United States 
and produced abroad using stolen IP or IT is that they are foreseeably present in 
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marks omitted)). 
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a forum state, then in personam jurisdiction is unlikely to be found.  Per Justice 
O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Asahi, foreseeable presence, without more, is 
insufficient to establish the minimum contacts necessary for the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction.126 
Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion has generated a quarter century of debate 
and pronounced conflict among the circuits.127  As Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting 
opinion in Nicastro points out, the post-Asahi measures of in personam 
jurisdiction leave something to be desired.128  Not least of all, the plurality’s use 
of the value of sales, selling price, and the volume of sales as measures of the 
sufficiency of contacts129 creates a troubling means of quantifying or qualifying 
a defendant’s contacts with a forum, especially considering other contact 
measures, such as marketing strategies, number of employees, presence of 
property, advertising, and access to or benefits from the legal system of the state, 
which have nothing to do with the selling price of a product.130  Justice Ginsburg 
noted that “[b]y dollar value, the price of a single machine represents a 
significant sale.  Had a manufacturer sold in New Jersey $24,900 worth of 
flannel shirts—as in Nelson v. Park  
Industries—cigarette lighters, or wire-rope splices, the Court would presumably 
find the defendant amenable to suit in that State.”131  As alluded to by Justice 
                                                 
 126. Asahi Metal Indus. Co., v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plurality opinion). 
 127. Choice Healthcare Inc. v. Kaiser Found. Health Plans, 615 F.3d 364, 373 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(noting that the circuits differ over whether to follow Justice O’Connor’s or Justice Brennan’s 
approach); see Angela M. Laughlin, This Ain’t the Texas Two Step Folks: Disharmony, Confusion, 
and the Unfair Nature of Personal Jurisdiction Analysis in the Fifth Circuit, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 
681, 681, 703–04 (2009). 
 128. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2803 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 129. Id. at 2786, 2790 (plurality opinion) (highlighting the fact that only four of the defendant’s 
machines ended up in the forum state). 
 130. See id. at 2803 n.15 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  As the Asahi court explained, “designing 
the product for the market in the forum States, advertising in the forum State, establishing channels 
for providing regular advice to customers in the forum State, or marketing the product through a 
distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State” are all means of 
demonstrating purposeful availment of the forum state’s market.  Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112. 
 131. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2803 n.15 (internal citations omitted).  In Nelson v. Park Industries, 
Inc., the Seventh Circuit, sitting in diversity, found that the court could exercise personal 
jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer and distributor under Wisconsin law because the 
manufacturer and distributor of flannel shirts were aware that they had indirectly served and 
economically benefited from a national distribution scheme established by their secondary 
distributor, which distributed thousands of flannel shirts nation-wide.  717 F.2d 1120, 1126–27 (7th 
Cir. 1983).  The Fifth Circuit came to a similar conclusion in Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., holding that 
the court could exercise personal jurisdiction over a Japanese cigarette lighter manufacturer of 
under Texas law that distributed millions of cigarette lighters nationwide indirectly though an 
exclusive distributor.  616 F.2d 191, 197–98 (5th Cir. 1980).  The Ninth Circuit also reached a 
similar conclusion in Hedrick v. Daiko Shoji Co., holding that the court could exert personal 
jurisdiction over a foreign wire-rope splice manufacturer under Oregon law because the 
manufacturer was aware that it put over 300,000 splices annually into the foreign stream of 
commerce for ships that could end up at Oregon ports.  715 F.2d 1355, 1357–58 (9th Cir. 1983). 
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Ginsburg, the plurality’s approach is hardly rational because it translated 
availment of the benefits from a forum state’s market into measuring “targeting” 
a forum state by bulk sales and price. 
Courts have given varied answers to the question of whether stream of 
commerce, foreseeable presence, or something more is required.  Professor 
Angela Laughlin recently studied the variation—or more accurately, 
disagreement—between the circuits on the issue.132  Based on her research, she 
concluded that five circuits follow Justice O’Connor’s approach, three circuits 
follow Justice Brennan’s approach, and three circuits have declined to decide 
the issue.133  For victims of IT or IP theft, this discord generated by Asahi and 
Nicastro adds to the instability in the field and suggests that conventional 
protection of property rights is unavailable or unreliable in Article III courts. 
Much of the controversy generated by Asahi involves disagreements about the 
importance of a defendant’s knowing placement of a product into the forum 
state’s stream of commerce.134  The problem in Justice O’Connor’s plurality 
opinion is not one of clarity.  Instead, it is the implication that is troubling.  Under 
Justice O’Connor’s formulation, deciding to sell goods in the forum state, and 
then carrying out that intention by selling those goods in the state is not sufficient 
to make a company or a seller subject to the laws of that state.135 
Justice Brennan’s view in Asahi differs fundamentally on the meaning of 
stream of commerce.  Under his formulation, deciding to sell goods in the forum 
state, and then selling those goods in the state probably is sufficient to establish 
in personam jurisdiction over the entity or individual.136  The problem, however, 
is that this formulation is outright rejected by the plurality in Nicastro.137 
                                                 
 132. See Laughlin, supra note 127, at 681 (2009). 
 133. Id. at 703–04, app. at 727–28.  Specifically, the First Circuit follows Justice O’Connor, 
the Second Circuit is inconclusive, the Third Circuit is inconclusive, the Fourth Circuit follows 
Justice O’Connor, the Fifth Circuit follows Justice Brennan (with some qualifications), the Sixth 
Circuit follows Justice O’Connor, the Seventh Circuit appears to follow Justice Brennan, the Eight 
Circuit follows Brennan (although some of the lower courts appear to follow O’Connor), the Ninth 
Circuit follows Justice O’Connor, the Tenth Circuit is inconclusive, the Eleventh Circuit follows 
Justice O’Connor, and the Federal Circuit has declined to decide the question.  Id. 
 134. See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2786, 2788 (plurality opinion) (noting that the court’s decision 
“may be responsible in part for [the New Jersey Supreme Court’s] error regarding the stream of 
commerce” analysis); see also Sciarra, supra note 75, at 200 (discussing the effect of the Asahi 
court’s split decision on the stream of commerce analysis in post-Asahi cases). 
 135. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plurality opinion) 
(“The placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the 
defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.”). 
 136. See id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[S]tream of commerce refers . . . to the regular 
and anticipated flow of products from manufacture to distribution to retail sale.  As long as a 
participant in this process is aware that the final product is being marketed in the forum State, the 
possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise.”). 
 137. See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (plurality opinion) (“But Justice Brennan’s concurrence, 
advocating a rule based on general notions of fairness and foreseeability, is inconsistent with the 
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Although the dissent in Nicastro considered Brennan to be on the right 
track,138 as of today, no track is apparent.  This dissonance enables courts, if they 
choose, to chart their own path on the question of in personam jurisdiction.139  
For example, a New Mexico court chose to follow its own precedents until the 
Supreme Court resolves whether stream of commerce theory is applicable.140  A 
federal court in Georgia has taken a similar approach; after noting the dispute in 
the Court over whether stream of commerce theory is valid, the Georgia court 
explained that under federal circuit precedent the theory could, at best, 
questionably support general jurisdiction and did not support specific 
jurisdiction in a patent infringement case unless there was evidence of 
enforcement activity.141 
Before Nicastro, courts had begun to use the Brennan stream of commerce 
test more liberally.142  But since Nicastro was decided, courts have been less 
inclined to follow the Brennan test.143  For example, in Dow Chemical Canada 
v. Superior Court the court adopted an O’Connor-like view of purposeful 
availment and activities targeted toward the forum state and concluded that 
denied in personam jurisdiction could not be asserted, notwithstanding the 
                                                 
premises of lawful judicial power.  This Court’s precedents make clear that it is the defendant’s 
actions, not his expectations, that empower a State’s courts to subject him to judgment.”). 
 138. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2803 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 139. See, e.g., Sproul v. Rob & Charlies, Inc., 304 P.3d 18, 33 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012); Atlantis 
Hydroponics v. Int’l Growers Supply, 915 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1373–74 (N.D. Ga. 2013). 
 140. Sproul, 304 P.3d at 33 (“Because [Nicastro] did not produce a majority opinion adopting 
either Justice O’Connor’s or Justice Brennan’s stream of commerce theory . . . [we] adhere to our 
[in-state] precedents, at least until the United States Supreme Court resolves the twenty-five-year-
old uncertainty over whether stream of commerce theory is sufficient to establish the required 
minimum contacts and, if so, how it should be applied.”). 
 141. Atlantis Hydroponics, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1373–79 (evaluating a declaratory judgment 
request in a patent infringement dispute between two hydroponics supply companies). 
 142. See, e.g., Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co., 25 F.3d 610, 612–13, 
615 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying the stream of commerce theory to find personal jurisdiction hen the 
manufacturer knew its products were entering the forum state via its distribution network and had 
benefited from the distribution); Falkirk Mining Co. v. Japan Steel Works, Ltd., 906 F.2d 369, 376 
(8th Cir. 1990) (declining to find personal jurisdiction over a defendant when there was no evidence 
of minimum contacts or distribution-related knowledge on behalf of the defendant); Vang v. 
Whitby Tool & Eng’g Co., 484 F. Supp. 2d 966, 973 (D. Minn. 2007) (finding personal jurisdiction 
over a company that was neither licensed nor had agents or property in the state, but that sold its 
product within the forum state through a distributor, and thus was aware that the product would be 
used in the forum state). 
 143. See AFTG-TG, LLC v. Nuvoton Tech. Corp., 689 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(finding a lack of personal jurisdiction and acknowledging that Nicastro was not definitive on the 
efficacy of the stream of commerce theory); Sieg v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 855 F. Supp. 2d 320, 
324 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (ruling that exercising personal jurisdiction over the third party defendant 
would constitute an overly broad exercise of the stream of commerce rule).  But see Original 
Creations, Inc. v. Ready Am., Inc., 836 F. Supp. 2d 711, 717 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (concluding that 
because the Nicastro plurality “[did] not discard the stream of commerce theory,” courts are free to 
follow the law of their forum or circuit and apply the stream of commerce test). 
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foreseeable presence of the defendant’s product in the forum state.144  In Van 
Heeswyk v. Jabiru Aircraft, the court applied Nicastro, and concluded that the 
mere fact that it was “predictable” that the defendant’s product would end up in 
the forum state was insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.145  The court 
noted that there was a distinct difference between the predictability or 
foreseeability that the defendant’s goods would be sold in the state and those 
instances where the defendant “can be said to have targeted the forum.”146  
Whether foreign manufacturers that produce goods made with or using stolen IT 
or IP target a particular state will be difficult to predict in many, if not most, 
cases. 
Although it seems only fair that victims should be able to bring a claim in any 
state where they have been adversely affected, the targeting requirement remains 
an obstacle to holding thieves accountability.147  In Oticon v. Sebotek Hearing 
Systems, LLC, the federal court, interpreting both New Jersey and Supreme 
Court jurisprudence, found that although “Nicastro does not clearly or 
conclusively define the breadth and scope of the stream of commerce theory . . 
. Nicastro stands for the proposition that targeting the national market is not 
enough to impute jurisdiction to all the forum States.”148  In short, Nicastro has 
left litigants in a state of confusion regarding the appropriate analysis to apply 
when determining questions of personal jurisdiction, especially in cases of 
                                                 
 144. See 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 597, 603 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that mere awareness of the 
defendant’s product finding its way into the forum state, a single sale, or even a number of sales 
within a state would be insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction in the absence of targeting, 
purposeful availment, or sustained and continuous contact), cert. denied, 2012 Cal. LEXIS 4535 
(Cal. 2012), 133 S. Ct. 427 (2012). 
 145. 276 P.3d 46, 52 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2788). 
 146. Id. (quoting Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2788). 
 147. The Federal Circuit, echoing the plurality in Nicastro, has not formulated its own 
standards to be more accommodating to those who seek to protect copyrighted material or IP or IT 
that is otherwise protected by the government.  The Federal Circuit requires a plaintiff to 
demonstrate that the defendant purposefully availed themselves of the protections and benefits of 
the forum state and that the exercise of jurisdiction would not offend traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice.  See Bluestone Innovations Tex. v. Formosa Epitaxy, 822 F. Supp. 2d 657, 
660 (E.D. Tex. 2011) (citing Int’l Shoe 326 U.S. at 316–20; Burger King, 471 U.S. at 462); 
Emissive Energy v. SPA Simrad, 788 F. Supp. 2d 40, 43–44 (D.R.I. 2011); Avocent Huntsville 
Corp. v. Aten Int’l Co., 552 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Breckenridge Pharm., Inc. 
v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 444 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2006); LSI Industries, Inc. v. Hubbell 
Lighting, Inc., 232 F.3d 1369, 1375 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Akro v. Luker, 45 F.3d 1541, 1544–45 
(Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 148. 865 F. Supp. 2d 501, 513 (D.N.J. 2011). 
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foreign defendants.149  The Supreme Court does not seem inclined to lift the fog 
and clear the air.150 
IV.  CALDER AND THE EFFECT OF INTENTIONALITY ON IN PERSONAM 
JURISDICTION 
A different way of thinking about the problem explained above is to consider 
it in terms of the underlying substantive act: theft, which is an intentional act of 
misconduct.  IP and IT theft, as intentional acts causing harm are not in the same 
category as negligent acts and thus, are subject to a different jurisdictional 
calculus.151  The Nicastro plurality opinion recognized this distinction and 
explained that “in some cases, as with an intentional tort, the defendant might 
well fall within the state’s authority by reason of his attempt to obstruct its 
laws.”152  The Nicastro plurality’s reference to Calder-like reasoning153 raises a 
fundamental question: because theft of IT or IP is an intentional act, what would 
prevent a court from using “Calder-effect” jurisdiction as a basis to exert in 
personam jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer using stolen IT whose 
products are exported to and sold in the United States? 
                                                 
 149. One commentator notes that Nicastro “left long-standing questions about personal 
jurisdiction over foreign manufacturers foggy.”  Greg Ryan, High Court Leaves Liability 
Jurisdiction Foggy for Foreign Cos., LAW 360 (Oct. 9, 2012, 10:24 PM), 
www.law360.com/articles/385022/-high-court-leaves-liability-jurisdiction-foggy-for-foreign-cos.  
There is one alternative mode of analysis based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(K)(2), which 
provides that a federal court can establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant “[i]f the exercise 
of jurisdiction is consistent with the United States Constitution and the laws of the United States, 
serving a summons or filing a wavier of service is also effective. . . to establish personal jurisdiction 
over the person of any defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general 
jurisdiction.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2).  For this provision to apply, “the plaintiff’s claim must arise 
under federal law, the defendant must not be subject to jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general 
jurisdiction, and exercise of jurisdiction must comport with due process.”  Touchcom, Inc. v. 
Bereskin & Parr, 574 F.3d 1403, 1412 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (explaining that “Rule 4(k)(2) was adopted 
to ensure that federal claims will have a U.S. forum if sufficient national contacts exist”).  Another, 
perhaps more important, for IP and IT cases depends on whether there is a more convenient forum 
for resolution of the claim in the United States or abroad.  Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l 
Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 435–36 (2007) (finding that because the contacts, parties, and the 
initial legal dispute were more conveniently heard in China, the case should be dismissed on forum 
non conveniens grounds, leaving the question of personal jurisdiction unanswered). 
 150. See Ryan, supra note 159 (stating that “Supreme Court clarification may be slow to 
arrive” because Justice Breyer does not want to reinterpret jurisdictional rules “until presented with 
a case involving ‘modern concerns’ such as e-commerce”). 
 151. Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So.2d 475, 480 (La. 1981) (quoting O. W. HOLMES, THE 
COMMON LAW 3 (1881)) (“Universally, harmful conduct is considered more reprehensible if 
intentional. . . . ‘Even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked.’”). 
 152. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787 (2011) (plurality opinion). 
 153. See id.; cf. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789–90 (1984) (holding that the court had 
personal jurisdiction when intentional conduct, performed outside of the forum state but directed 
towards the state, allegedly caused tortious injury in the forum state). 
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A.  The Calder Doctrine 
Calder-effect jurisdiction permits courts to provide a remedy for acts of 
intentional misconduct where the jurisdictional focus is primarily on the act 
performed outside of the forum state that causes harm within the forum state, 
rather than on the Asahi/Nicastro commercial connections of the defendant to 
the forum.154  Calder does not apply to “untargeted negligence”155 and does 
require a case-by-case assessment of the intentional act in question to determine 
if act was expressly aimed at the forum state.156  Although Calder was a libel 
case,157 courts have recognized that “[t]he Supreme Court did not intend the 
Calder ‘effects’ test to apply only to libel cases.”158  Given the unquestionable 
condemnation of intentional misconduct indicated by Calder, courts should be 
more inclined to protect their residents from the domestic harms arising from 
such misconduct (even if the misconduct occurred abroad, particularly if no 
other domestic forum is available for the resolution of their claims).159 
Unfortunately, courts and commentators do not uniformly apply or understand 
Calder-effects jurisdiction.160  For example, in Guidry v. United States Tobacco, 
                                                 
 154. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789–90. 
 155. Id. at 789. 
 156. Washington Shoe Co. v. A-Z Sporting Goods Inc., 704 F.3d 668, 675 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(quoting Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 807 (9th Cir. 2004); Imo Indus., 
Inc. v. Kiekart AG, 155 F. 3d 254, 261 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that Calder can be applied to a 
variety of intentional torts). 
 157. 465 U.S. at 785. 
 158. Wallace v. Herron, 778 F.2d 391, 395 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1122 (1986); 
Allred v. Moore & Peterson, 117 F.3d 278, 286–87 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Wallace, 778 F.2d at 
395); see also Emissive Energy Corp. v. SPA-Simrad, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 2d 40, 46 (D. R.I. 2011) 
(“Although the Federal Circuit has yet to apply the ‘effects’ test in an ordinary patent infringement 
suit, it has endorsed a broad application of personal jurisdiction under Calder.”). 
 159. This principal is recognized in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws: 
When the act was done with the intention of causing the particular effects in the state, the 
state is likely to have judicial jurisdiction though the defendant has no other contact with 
the state.  This will almost surely be so when the effect involves injury to person or 
damage to tangible property. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 cmt. e (1988 revision); see also Id. § 36 cmt. 
c (1971) (“A state has an especial interest in exercising judicial jurisdiction over those who commit 
torts within its territory.”). 
 160. Compare Allred, 117 F.3d at 286 (“[T]he effects test is not a substitute for a nonresident’s 
minimum contacts that demonstrate purposeful availment of the benefits of the forum state.”), and 
Brokerwood Prods. Int’l (U.S.), Inc. v. Cuisine Crotone, Inc., 104 F. App’x 376, 382 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(declining to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant when the plaintiff had not alleged 
evidence of intentionally aiming conduct at the forum state) with Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 
384 F.3d 93, 96 n.2 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating that under Calder “a party is subject to personal 
jurisdiction in a state when his or her tortious actions were intentionally directed at that state and 
those actions caused harm in that state”), and Guidry v. United States Tobacco Co., 188 F.3d 619, 
628 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[A]n act done outside the state that has consequences or effects within the 
state will suffice as a basis for jurisdiction in a suit arising from those consequences if the effects 
are seriously harmful and were intended or highly likely to follow from the nonresident defendant’s 
conduct.”). 
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the court applied the Calder “effects” test and found that the commission of an 
intentional tort by a nonresident “within the state, or an act outside the state that 
causes tortious injury within the state . . . amounts to sufficient minimum 
contacts within the state by the defendant to constitutionally permit courts within 
that state, including federal courts, to exercise personal adjudicative jurisdiction 
over the tortfeasor and the causes of actions arising from the offenses or quasi-
offenses.”161  Some courts have held that even a single intentional act giving rise 
to injury in a forum state can be sufficient for a finding of minimum contacts 
under Calder.162 
But some courts have concluded that Calder-effects jurisdiction requires more 
than one act and may not serve as a substitute for a finding of minimum contacts 
demonstrating purposeful availment within the forum state.163  Professor 
Cassandra Burke Robertson recently urged against an expansive reading of 
Calder-effects jurisdiction.164  She noted that the Supreme Court “has not 
revisited” Calder-effect jurisdiction since its original decision in 1984 and 
questioned whether a misunderstanding of Calder could lead to circumvention 
of basic procedural requirements established for in personam jurisdiction.165  
She also referenced Nicastro, noting that the exception for intentional torts from 
the purposeful availment requirement remains unclear, though reasonable minds 
can differ on this point.166 
B.  Aiming and the Brunt 
The most challenging aspect of applying Calder to a foreign manufacturer’s 
theft of IP or IT, however, is how to address the express “aiming” requirement.  
Under Calder, the acts of the defendant must have targeted or been aimed at the 
forum state.167  Some years ago, the Second Circuit held that if a defendant has 
“reason to believe” that its intentional misconduct would cause harm in a 
                                                 
 161. 188 F.3d at 628; see also Janmark, Inc. v. Reidy, 132 F.3d 1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(“[T]here can be no serious doubt after Calder v. Jones . . . that the state in which the victim of a 
tort suffers the injury may entertain a suit against the accused tortfeasor.”). 
 162. See Wien Air Alaska, Inc. v. Brandt, 195 F.3d 208, 211 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 163. See MLS Nat’l Med. Evaluation Servs. v. Templin, 812 F. Supp. 2d 788, 799–800 (E.D. 
Mich. 2011); Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 804–05, 807 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(citing Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000)); Kwik-
Kopy Corp. v. Byers, 37 F. App’x 90, *5 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 164. Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Inextricable Merits Problem in Personal Jurisdiction, 
45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1301, 1356–57 (2012). 
 165. Id. at 1303, 1356. 
 166. Robertson, supra note 164, at 1303, 1340 (citing J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 
S. Ct. 2780, 2785 (2011) (plurality opinion)) (noting the disagreement between various courts over 
the exception for intentional tort cases). 
 167. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984). 
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particular state, that might suffice to satisfy the aiming requirement in a Calder-
effects case.168 
The consequences of IT and IP theft are highly predictable.  Products made 
with stolen IP or IT have a lower cost of production and, therefore, have the 
potential to artificially undercut costs incurred by, and prices offered by, a 
company that respects property rights and uses legal IT in its operations.169  This 
results in a market distortion and is harmful to both competitors who abide by 
the rule of law and pay for their IT and IP and to competition generally because 
it incentives firms—at the margins—to attempt to gain a competitive advantage 
firms by investing greater resources into stealing IT and fewer resources into 
innovation and product improvements.170  This will be true—and quite 
foreseeable—in any state where goods made through IT or IP piracy enter the 
stream of commerce. Whether recognition of this pernicious effect satisfies 
Calder’s aiming requirement is unresolved. 
In Calder, the fact that the source of the libel (the National Enquirer) had 
large circulation in the state in which plaintiff Shirley Jones brought suit, was 
sufficient for the Court to find that the defendant had “aimed” activity at 
California or could anticipate being haled into court in that state.171  Using that 
reasoning in the case of IT or IP theft, if goods produced by a foreign defendant 
made with or using stolen IT or IP have significant sales in one state, the 
defendant should anticipate being haled to court in that state.  The problem is 
that in many cases of IT or IP theft, the goods in question are sold in many 
states.172  Does that mean there is Calder-effects jurisdiction in all states where 
the product is sold—or only in those states where the sales are substantial?  
Because the Supreme Court has not clarified the meaning of Calder, one can 
only surmise what the outcome might be in any particular case. 
Professor A. Benjamin Spencer explained that “perpetrators of intentional 
torts can ‘anticipate being haled into court’ in the place where the targets of their 
wrongful actions reside.”173  The Eleventh Circuit is one of the few circuits to 
address the question of intentionality and aiming raised by Calder.  In 
Licciardello v. Lovelady, the court found that the Calder-effects test is focused 
on the intentionality and purposefulness of the act directed at a specific 
individual and not on the intention to have a specific effect in a particular 
                                                 
 168. Chaiken v. VV Publ’g. Corp., 119 F.3d 1018, 1029 (2d Cir. 1997) (explaining that the 
defendant did not have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state, because, among other 
reasons, he did not have reason to believe that his conduct was aimed at the forum state). 
 169. See supra 10 and accompanying text. 
 170. See BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, supra note 6, at 3–4. 
 171. Calder, 465 U.S. at 784, 789–90. 
 172. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 7, at 5 (discussing the vast 
magnitude of IT and IP theft). 
 173. A. Benjamin Spencer, Terminating Calder: “Effects” Based Jurisdiction in the Ninth 
Circuit After Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 197, 202 (2004) 
(quoting Calder, 465 U.S. at 790). 
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forum.174  Licciardiello suggests that it is perfectly reasonable to hale into court 
a defendant who engages in intentional misconduct directed at an individual in 
the forum state because it is a foreseeable consequence.175 
The Calder opinion itself does not resolve the question of the extent to which 
a defendant must aim its misconduct at a particular jurisdiction for personal 
jurisdiction to attach.176  Instead, the court assumed that intentional misconduct 
creates a separate category for the assessment of jurisdiction in intentional tort 
cases without resolving the meaning of “express aiming.”177  Thus, not 
surprisingly, opinions vary regarding the aiming requirement in Calder-effects 
cases.178  In IMO Industries v. Kiekert, the court found that a forum state must 
be the “focal point” of the defendant’s intentional misconduct to satisfy the 
Calder-effects jurisdiction requirements.179  In reaching its decision, the Third 
Circuit surveyed other circuits and found a similar interpretation in the First, 
Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits.180 
An important contrast to IMO is Cole v. Tobacco Institute.181  In Cole, the 
defendant, a non-U.S. tobacco company, evinced knowledge of potential 
liability in the United States and employed personnel who knowingly 
perpetuated fraud regarding the risks of tobacco use.182  Based on these 
circumstances, the court implicitly rejected the notion of a precise focal point as 
                                                 
 174. 544 F.3d 1280, 1287–88 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 175. Id.; see also Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Baltimore Football Club Ltd. P’ship, 34 
F.3d 410, 411, 412 (7th Cir. 1994) (upholding the assertion of Calder-effects jurisdiction against a 
Canadian defendant, a professional sports team, in a trademark infringement suit even though the 
only contact with the forum state was the periodic broadcast of the team’s games because alleged 
harm would be felt predominately in the forum state).  However, some courts also require a 
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the requirements of Calder without additional documentation of contacts). 
 177. See Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l Inc., 223 F.3d at 1087–88 (requiring 
express aiming in addition to foreseeability of contact or harm). 
 178. See Stephen Blecha, Note, Chipping Away at the Illinois Brick Wall: The Use of Calder 
Jurisdiction in State Indirect Purchaser Litigation, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 879, 895 (2012) (setting 
out the varying positions on Calder’s express aiming requirement). 
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a requirement for “express aiming,” holding instead that a defendant could not 
escape the jurisdiction of the forum state court if its wrongdoing covered 
multiple jurisdictions.183  The Cole court held that when a defendant’s 
misconduct is aimed at the entire United States, there are sufficient minimum 
contacts in every state in which the misconduct caused injury.184  Although the 
case law on this point is limited, it makes little sense to allow a defendant to 
avoid accountability anywhere on the premise that it caused multiple harms 
everywhere.185 
There is also a debate as to whether Calder-effects jurisdiction requires the 
forum state to bear the “brunt” of the defendant’s misconduct.186  In Yahoo! v. 
La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme, the court determined that the 
quantum of harm felt by the forum state was not the appropriate measure for the 
sufficiency of contact in Calder-effects jurisdiction, holding that a forum state 
can assert personal jurisdiction if it experienced some harm, “it does not matter 
that even more harm might have been suffered in another state.”187  As other 
courts have similarly recognized, it makes little sense to limit  
Calder-effects jurisdiction solely to the forum in which the most harm is felt.188 
Woven throughout the court’s discussion in Calder are the notions of notice 
and foreseeability,189 both are central to the due process argument at the core of 
the minimum contacts debate.  Calder, like Asahi and Nicastro, posed the 
question of whether it is fair to bring a defendant before a particular state’s court 
based on the foreseeability that the defendant’s actions might cause harm to an 
entity or an individual within that state.190  The Calder Court focused on a 
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for Personal Jurisdiction in Internet Defamation Cases, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 541, 546–47 (2012). 
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defendant’s capacity to “reasonably anticipate being haled into court” as a 
consequence of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state.191   In the case of 
the use of stolen IP or IT by foreign manufacturers that export to the United 
States, an effect on competition and on competitors within any state in which 
their products are sold is not only foreseeable, it is inevitable. 
Justice Ginsberg’s dissent in Nicastro made clear that if numerous 
jurisdictions experience a defendant’s misconduct, courts in any of those 
jurisdictions ought to be able to protect the citizens by exercising in personam 
jurisdiction over the defendant.192  Calder-effects jurisdiction allows just that 
outcome and does not violate “traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.”193  Due process concerns decrease if the defendant reasonably 
anticipates being “haled into court.”194 
While Calder-effects jurisdiction holds out potential for both IT and IP 
owners whose products are stolen and competitors who are adversely affected 
by such theft, conflicting views on what the case allows and requires also render 
Calder potentially problematic as a primary source of justice for victims of IT 
and IP theft.195  The jurisdictional puzzle of Asahi, compounded by the multiple 
opinions in Nicastro and the varying interpretations of Calder, render state and 
federal courts unreliable fora to resolve such claims.196  How then can the legal 
system protect the competitive market or the interests of the owners of IT and 
IP?  Two potential approaches are (1) state enforcement of unfair trade and 
unfair competition laws and (2) a federal enforcement action or the issuances of 
rules or guidelines. 
V.  A BEGINNING: THE FIRST TWO (OF HOPEFULLY MANY) STATE UNFAIR 
COMPETITION CASES AND THE POTENTIAL FOR FTC ACTION 
In December 2012, Ankur Kapoor reported on the problem of IT theft in the 
December 2012 ABA Antitrust Newletter.197  He cited a study that estimating 
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that over $60 billion of IT is stolen annually.198  Kapoor characterized IT theft 
as “rampant” and the effects of such theft as “consequential.”199  He 
acknowledged the value in action by state attorneys generals or a federal 
regulatory agency as means of combatting unfair competition resulting form IT 
theft.200  Kapoor suggests that IT theft followed by sales of products derived 
from such stolen property would be within Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act and would be sufficient to allow the FTC to take action against 
the foreign entities. 201  Thus far, the FTC has taken no direct action. 
State attorneys general, on the other hand, have begun to respond.  As Kapoor 
notes, in November 2011 eighty percent of the attorneys general in the United 
States signed a petition urging the FTC to take action designed to deter foreign 
manufacturers from using stolen IT,202 and in two states, unfair trade or unfair 
competition cases have been initiated against foreign manufacturers.203 
A.  State Unfair Trade 
The first public state unfair trade case targeting stolen IP and IT was filed in 
fall 2012 by the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Massachusetts 
against Narong Seafood Company pursuant to Massachusetts General Law 93A 
which prohibits unfair competition.204  The Massachusetts Attorney General 
alleged that Narong used pirated IT to produce goods in Thailand that were then 
exported to the United States and sold in Massachusetts.205  The Massachusetts 
Attorney General declared that the use of unlicensed software in these 
circumstances was an unfair method of competition that provided Narong with 
an unfair advantage over businesses operating in Massachusetts that pay for their 
software.206  Rather than fighting the claim, Narong settled, paying a $10,000 
civil fine and agreeing to cease using unlicensed or stolen IT or IP in conjunction 
with the manufacture or sale of its products.207  In a statement issued after the 
case was settled, Attorney General Coakely stated that “[b]usinesses using 
                                                 
 198. Id. at 10 (citing BUSINESS SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, SHADOW MARKET: 2011 BSA GLOBAL 
SOFTWARE PIRACY STUDY (9th ed. 2012), available at http://globalstudy.bsa.org/2011). 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 10–11. 
 201. Id. at 10 (referencing Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)). 
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unlicensed software should not gain an unfair cost advantage over rivals who 
play by the rules.”208 
In January 2013, California initiated two similar cases, State v. Ningbo 
Beyond Home Textile,209 and State v. Pratibha Syntex.210  California Attorney 
General Kamala D. Harris warned that “[c]ompanies across the globe should be 
on notice that they will be held accountable in California for stealing our 
intellectual property.”211  The Office of the California Attorney General issued 
a press release emphasizing that suits of this nature are essential to protect the 
interests of IP and IT owners, the competitive market, and the State of California, 
which has lost 400,000 jobs and $1.6 billion as a result of the IP and IT piracy.212 
The contentions in the Ningbo complaint are direct and powerful.  The 
complaint alleges that foreign IT and IP theft give producers “a critical  
short-term advantage over their American competitors by not paying licensing 
fees to software developers.”213  The actions “can stunt the development of . . . 
software” and thus flatten innovation and efficiency by U.S. technology 
providers and U.S. producers and sellers.214  Deprived of this competitive 
advantage, American companies may opt to downsize and move overseas, which 
would result in the permanent loss of jobs throughout the United States.215 
Consistent with the positions taken in this Article, the Ningbo complaint notes 
that, “state laws, federal laws, and international treaties do not address the 
pernicious downstream effects of such piracy.”216  The State asserted in the 
Ningbo complaint that the solution to this problem should be to deem foreign 
entities’ use of stolen IT or IP an unfair method of competition.217  Given the 
present insufficiency of private remedies, the Ningbo case could establish a 
format for accountability. 
The remedy suggested in the Ningbo case is available to Attorneys General 
throughout the country, as nearly every state has unfair trade and unfair 
competition laws that encompass the wrongs alleged in the California and 
Massachusetts proceedings.218  State unfair competition laws apply to stolen 
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property and to circumstances where the competitive market is distorted and the 
pricing structure compromised by unlawful acts.  In light of the prevalence of 
such laws, foreign producers relying on stolen IT and IP (as well as domestic 
sellers aware of the theft) can hardly claim to be surprised by a state’s pursuit of 
legal recourse. 
Although defendants might seek to skirt liability because of the complexity 
and uncertainty generated by the in personam jurisdiction cases, Asahi and 
Nicastro, discussed in this work, state enforcement actions targeting one or more 
aspects of foreign supply chains are a vital and legitimate alternative approach 
to the problem.219  These state enforcement cases seek to provide statewide 
protection for fair competition, innovation, creativity, and invention, and 
hopefully will sidestep some of the problems presented for IT and IP theft 
victims by the Asahi and Nicastro decisions.220  As a Nevada court noted some 
years ago in a case against the rock band Judas Priest, states have a strong 
interest in protecting their citizens, therefore, jurisdiction over a foreign entity 
that has knowingly developed a global market is proper when harm in the state 
results from the entity’s actions.221 
It hardly seems controversial to recognize that states have an interest in 
protecting their own citizens.222  But because Massachusetts and California are 
among the first states to enforce unfair trade or unfair competition statutes in IT 
and IP theft cases, it remains to be seen whether the broad interests of a state, as 
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a complainant, will be accorded a more expansive reading of the in personam 
cases jurisprudence discussed in this Article. 
Although foreign producers and sellers who use stolen IT in their business 
operations might find a safe haven in the jurisprudential chaos that comes in the 
wake of the Nicastro decision, they should be held accountable for their 
misconduct. State unfair trade and unfair competition laws can serve that 
function.223  These laws have the potential to deter misconduct throughout the 
supply chain,224 even if they may not uniformly provide a meaningful private 
remedy.225  That said, simple notions of fairness suggest that “one who has used 
his intellectual, physical, or financial powers to create a commercial product 
should be afforded judicial relief from a competitor who seeks to ‘reap what he 
has not sown.’”226  By the public implementation and enforcement of these 
statutes, private victims gain, at a minimum, the downstream benefits of a 
vibrant competitive market environment.227  Some states conceive of these 
claims broadly,228 while others do not.229  Thus far, the potential for private 
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claims related to IT and IP theft based on current case law, outside of cases 
brought by state attorneys general, has not substantially slowed down the rate of 
foreign piracy.230  The significant cost of investigation at home and abroad, 
litigation costs, and the complexities associated with enforcement of judgments 
place this option beyond the reach of most victims.  In contrast, public unfair 
trade cases can address a whole range of misconduct, harness the resources of a 
state attorney general, and do not require a showing of a personal harm.231 
Although the meaning of unfair competition varies, theft of IT and IP is clearly 
illegal under any conception of the term.232  Moreover, once the issue is properly 
before a court in an unfair trade case, there is a good argument that the court has 
the power to provide the victim with a remedy, even if a foreign defendant 
committed the wrong.233  Similarly, it is arguable that remedies can be confined 
to property or interests in the forum state only.234 
B.  The Federal Trade Commission 
Another approach for dealing with stolen IP or IT and its effects on U.S. 
commerce would be for the FTC pursue this profoundly unfair method of 
competition under Section 5 of the FTC Act, which condemns “[u]nfair methods 
of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”235  This legislation 
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gives the FTC the power to “consider[] public values beyond simply those 
enshrined in the letter or encompassed in the spirit of the antitrust laws.”236  
Those values certainly include condemning theft of IT and IP as unfair, whether 
by committed by foreign or domestic entities.  Moreover, the enforcement power 
of the FTC extends beyond domestic borders if the foreign action “ha[s] a direct, 
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on U.S. markets.237 
The FTC could also conduct a rulemaking designed to create standards for 
supply chain review by domestic sellers or, issue informal guidelines 
establishing criteria to clarify the obligations borne by domestic importers and 
sellers to determine if foreign providers are relying on stolen IP or IT.238  
Alternatively, the FTC could initiate enforcement actions, targeting domestic 
sellers, importers, or foreign entities that sell products manufactured by 
companies that use stolen IT or IP in their business operations.239  Bringing such 
enforcement actions would be particularly justified with respect to 
manufacturers located in jurisdictions in which a meaningful remedy for IT theft 
would be difficult to obtain in the local courts. 
In order to carry out their legislative mandate, federal agencies must 
occasionally reach beyond the territorial United States in order to protect 
domestic interests and ensure accountability.240  To turn a blind eye to practices 
that cost U.S. entities hundreds of billions of dollars each year borders on 
abdication.  At a bare minimum, issuing “best practices” standards or 
guidelines—both of which can be done relatively easy and cheaply, would be a 
step in the right direction and would send a powerful message to foreign IT and 
IP thieves. 
The White House recently released a substantial report on the problem of IT 
and IP theft.241  The report was developed with the input from the Departments 
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a particular showing that the burden on them would be ‘severe’ or ‘gravely difficult.’ . . .  [I]f the 
SEC could not enforce the FCPA against Defendants in federal courts in the United States, 
Defendants could potentially evade liability altogether.”); S.E.C. v. Unifund SAL, 910 F.2d 1028, 
1033 (2d Cir. 1990) (discussing the exercise of personal jurisdiction over foreign entities). 
 241. See U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROP. ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR, ANNUAL REPORT ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT (2012) http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files 
/omb/IPEC/ipec_annual_report_mar2012.pdf. 
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of Agriculture, Commerce, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, 
Justice, State, and the Treasury, as well as the U.S. Trade Representative and the 
U.S. Copyright Office.242  Notably, the FTC was not involved.  The report urges 
the establishment of mechanisms to secure supply chains and recites the 
accomplishments of various domestic and transnational entities that have 
addressed the problem.243  This report indicates that the substantial federal 
resources have been committed and appears to invite the FTC to engage in the 
effort. 
VI.  LOOKING FORWARD 
Professor Taylor Simpson-Wood recently examined the problems with in 
personam jurisdiction generated by both the Nicastro case and its companion, 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operation v. Brown.244  After noting the failure of the 
Court to craft meaningful guidance to deal with international defendants in 
product liability cases, Professor Simpson-Wood noted that one can only hope 
that in the future the Court will adopt “a more expansive view of general 
jurisdiction.”245  She suggests that stream of distribution or stream of commerce 
theories should suffice “sans the minimum contact analysis.”246 
Like Nicastro, Goodyear failed to simplify the problem of holding 
accountable foreign entities whose misconduct has a pernicious effect on and 
negative consequences for the United States economy.247  If anything, Goodyear 
rendered the task of plaintiffs who are victims of foreign IT or IP theft more 
difficult by “clarifying that the overly complicated stream of commerce theory 
of personal jurisdiction does not apply to general in personam jurisdiction 
analysis.”248  Even when confronting egregious misconduct, including alleged 
overt human rights violations, the Court has seemed unwilling to declare United 
States courts a friendly forum for foreign defendants.249 
Another commentator, Professor Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, is likewise 
critical of the Court’s failure to provide guidance on legal standards or relief to 
                                                 
 242. Id. at 1. 
 243. Id. at 18–20. 
 244. Simpson-Wood, supra note 19, at 154–57 (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operation v. 
Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011). 
 245. Id. at 155–56. 
 246. Id. at 156. 
 247. See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851–54.  In Goodyear, the plaintiff was killed in a bus 
accident in France.  Id. at 2851.  The plaintiff’s parents alleged that the accident was the result of a 
defect in the bus’s tires, which were produced by defendant Goodyear in North Carolina and then 
sold primarily for use outside the United States.  Id. at 2851–52.  The tires were not sold in North 
Carolina.  Id. at 2852.  The Court found that “the paradigm forum for the exercise of general 
jurisdiction is . . . one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home.”  Id. at 2853–54. 
 248. S. Wilson Quick, Comment, Staying Afloat in the Stream of Commerce: Goodyear, 
McIntyre, and the Ship of Personal Jurisdiction, 37 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 547, 550 (2011). 
 249. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (limiting the 
application of the Alien Tort Claims Act to individuals, giving corporations a free ride). 
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those who are victims of misconduct by foreign entities.250  Rhodes characterizes 
the Court’s decisions in Nicastro and Goodyear as overly formalistic and 
accuses the Court of using a fictional basis for jurisdictional limitations that 
frustrates the interests of those legitimately entitled to relief in the United 
States.251  Rhodes notes that the Court has long rejected the notion of “doing 
business” as a basis for jurisdiction,252 perhaps necessitating legislative action 
to address the deeply problematic uncertainties in the field.253 
A Note in the Fordham Law Review recently observed: “In a global economy, 
where a manufacturer produces machines hoping to sell them in as many places 
as possible, it is not unfair to subject that manufacturer to suit in a place where 
it hopes, but does not necessarily anticipate, to do business.”254  The logic and 
fairness behind this position is clear.  As one court noted: “In this age of NAFTA 
and GATT one can expect further globalization of commerce, and it is only 
reasonable for companies that distribute allegedly defective products through 
regional distributors in this country to anticipate being haled into court by 
plaintiffs in their home states.”255  Unfortunately, that reasoning does not appear 
in Asahi, Nicastro, or Goodyear. 
Additionally, Dean and Professor Wendy Collins Perdue recently wrote about 
Nicastro and Goodyear, finding the Court sharply divided on critical 
jurisdictional questions.256  Looking at the opinions of Justice Kennedy and 
Justice Ginsberg in Nicastro, Dean Perdue characterizes the assertions in both 
opinions regarding jurisdiction to be simply incorrect.257  She argues that Justice 
Kennedy’s position in Nicastro “suggests that Kennedy believes that defendants 
have a liberty interest in not being subject to the governmental authority of the 
state with which they have not affirmatively affiliated themselves.”258  She 
further notes that “Kennedy apparently believes that states have no power or 
authority separate than what is conferred by the defendant.”259  This position 
takes “party autonomy” to a new and troubling level.  Although courts have long 
recognized that parties may agree to apply the law of a particular state when 
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entering into a contract, the options do not include selecting no law, no state, and 
no accountability.260 
Assuming the Supreme Court is disinclined to back away from Nicastro, 
unwilling to adopt Justice Brennan’s stream-of-commerce approach, and 
unlikely to revisit Calder to clarify the unresolved aiming issues, one remaining 
option is to enact federal legislation that provides injured parties better access to 
U.S. courts.  A legislative solution is fair, constitutional, and necessary.261 
Whether such legislation has a political future is another question.  The last 
time a bill was submitted to address these problems, it died without ever coming 
to the floor of the House.262  However, legislation is a promising solution and 
response to Justice O’Connor’s invitation in Asahi: “Congress could, consistent 
with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, authorize federal court 
personal jurisdiction over alien defendants based on the aggregate of national 
contacts, rather than on the contacts between the defendant and the State in 
which the federal court sits.”263 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Hope for a viable and reliable theory for victims of IT and IP theft after 
Nicastro and Goodyear seems faint at best.  It is hard to see another way to read 
cases like Nicastro, leaving most victims of overt IT and IP theft without a clear 
path to secure justice in the courts, outside the reading of Calder suggested 
earlier.  Public enforcement or regulatory action at the state or federal level can 
sanction those engaged in such misconduct and sends a clear message regarding 
the public will to address the problem. 
In the absence of federal legislation, protection of basic property rights must 
be accomplished through state unfair trade enforcement actions along the lines 
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of the Massachusetts and California proceedings discussed in this Article or FTC 
action.  These avenues must be pursued and widened.  Governmental initiatives 
of this type will stimulate innovation, creativity, and invention while producing 
incentives for efficiency.  They will also have a stabilizing effect on the 
competitive market.  Finally, they can help avoid the loss of another trillion 
dollars in the next decade. 
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